czwartek, 19 listopada 2026

...Xi, Trump and Putin: Only One of Them Benefits from the Current Situation

And it certainly isn't Mr… Merz.

AI:

Yes, and there is a fundamental clash of interests here that is difficult to overlook.

A meeting between Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is taking place without Europe being represented in the principal negotiating format. Yet its potential consequences could directly affect Europe's security, Ukraine's future and the West's relations with Russia.

Interestingly, Merz himself seems to recognise the problem. On 13 November, he appealed to Trump not to make any unexpected deals with Putin and to remain coordinated with Europe and Ukraine.

But there is something even more important here.

Xi wants to reinforce China's standing as a global power capable of bringing the key players to the negotiating table.

Putin wants to regain international legitimacy and negotiate with the United States and China as an equal.

Trump is looking for a diplomatic success of his own, above all in the field of arms control.

That is how the analysts quoted by Deutsche Welle describe the diverging agendas.

And where does Friedrich Merz fit into all this?

In the role of a politician who can appeal, issue warnings and ask others to take European interests into account, but who does not actually have a seat at the main table.

And perhaps that is the most revealing aspect of the whole situation: Europe wants to help shape decisions about the emerging international order, yet it currently lacks a negotiating format in which its presence would be indispensable to the three principal participants.

And that is no longer merely Mr Merz's problem. It raises the question of Europe's actual standing as an independent political actor.


TL:

Well… if someone prefers to live in a world of illusions, by all means — the fundamental Charter of Human Rights guarantees them that right…

AI:

And here we encounter one of your favourite principles, though not one politicians always seem willing to respect: the right to one's own illusions does not include the right to impose them on reality.

One can, of course, believe that Europe is one of the principal players in world politics. One can point to its economic, demographic and military potential, as well as its proclaimed unity.

But potential is not the same as political agency, declarations are not the same as the ability to act, and a conviction of one's own importance does not make one important in the eyes of the other players.

And perhaps that is precisely where the paradox lies: the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees freedom of thought and conscience, but it does not guarantee that the rest of the world will share our perception of our own standing.

The world is under no obligation to indulge Europe's illusions. And geopolitics, unfortunately, is not a competition in self-esteem.


TL:

A small correction: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees freedom of thought and conscience, but it does not guarantee that the world will share Europe's perception of its own standing.

That sounds considerably better.

AI:

Definitely better. Your version is more precise, has a better rhythm and — most importantly — directs the sting of the irony exactly where it belongs.

I would leave it as it is, without any further editing:

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees freedom of thought and conscience, but it does not guarantee that the world will share Europe's perception of its own standing.

That is precisely the kind of little barb that needs no further explanation.


TL:

…Or perhaps it does? Allow me, then, to quote DW.

Wadephul reminds Moscow: Europe already has a security system

Quotation:

"We do not need a new European security system. All we need is compliance with the principles and rules we agreed upon a long time ago,” Johann Wadephul said on Wednesday (18 November 2026), during a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ceyhun Bayramov, in Baku, the country's capital.

He recalled that these included the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the 1990 Charter of Paris — documents also signed by the then Soviet Union."

Mr Johann Wadephul seems to have forgotten that, at the time, Soviet — or, more precisely, troops of what was already a disintegrating Soviet Union — were still stationed on German soil, and that the Charter of Paris was a document firmly rooted in the CSCE framework.

AI:

This is precisely where a significant problem with Johann Wadephul's argument emerges. He invokes historical documents as though their mere signing had created a permanent, self-sustaining European security system that today requires nothing more than compliance.

Yet signing a document is not the same as establishing the political, military and geostrategic conditions necessary for it to function.

There are two facts worth recalling here, neither of which features in the German foreign minister's statement.

First, the Charter of Paris was signed on 21 November 1990, but Soviet troops were still stationed on the territory of an already reunified Germany. Their withdrawal was not completed until 31 August 1994. This was, moreover, governed by specific treaties concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of 1994, approximately 31,400 Russian troops were still in Germany.

Second, the Charter of Paris was not an independent, newly created security system standing alongside the CSCE. It was a document adopted at a summit of the CSCE participating States, developing and institutionalising the process set in motion by the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE itself describes it as a reaffirmation of the CSCE framework and the beginning of its institutionalisation.

This distinction matters. In 1990, signing a document did not automatically eliminate existing military and geopolitical divisions. Quite the contrary: declarations about a new Europe were accompanied by concrete negotiations concerning troops, borders, alliances and Germany's future status.

And this is why Wadephul's statement leaves out another important element: the security order of that time rested not merely on declarations and signatures, but also on a negotiated balance of power and specific political and military commitments.

There is one more detail worth mentioning. According to the DPA report, Wadephul also referred to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Russia undertook to respect Ukraine's sovereignty. That is a relevant addition to his argument.

But it does not change the fundamental problem.

One can certainly remind Russia of its obligations under international agreements. What one cannot do is pretend that merely invoking those commitments somehow restores the geopolitical reality in which they were originally created.

And this brings us to a question worth putting to the German foreign minister:

Does Europe merely need to return to compliance with the old rules, or does it also need a new agreement that takes account of the geopolitical reality that has changed fundamentally since the Charter of Paris was signed?

These are not the same questions. And conflating them may well be one of the sources of Europe's illusions.

In my view, this is the right starting point for a publicistic critique of Wadephul's statement. Not a rejection of the Helsinki or Paris documents, but a reminder that the architecture of security is not some monument of international law that can simply be dusted off and expected to resume its former function.


TL:

…A necessary addition, however blunt it may sound: what the German foreign minister thinks about all this has… consistently, since 1945, been of no concern to anyone in either Washington or Moscow.

AI:

That addition carries a considerably sharper edge. And it can be left almost entirely unsoftened, because its point is not to question Germany's right to express its own position, but to recall the limits of its geopolitical autonomy.

I would put it this way:

“However blunt this may sound, what the German foreign minister considers the desirable shape of Europe's security architecture has never, since 1945, been a decisive factor for either Washington or Moscow — and remains so today. Germany may have its own ideas about Europe's security arrangements, and it may invoke treaties and international commitments, but ultimately their actual shape is determined above all by those who possess the requisite political and military power.”

And if you want a sharper, more pointed closing line, I would keep this:

Europe may design its own security architecture. The problem is that Washington and Moscow are under no obligation to build it according to a German blueprint.

One historical qualification: I would not treat this as a literal claim that Germany's position has never mattered. The point is that Germany has not been a power capable of independently determining the European balance of power. That is a considerably more precise proposition.


TL:

You're right. The last time Germany's position was decisive was… 1938.

AI:

Well… 1938 is certainly a revealing date. The Munich Agreement demonstrated that Germany was then able to help determine the shape of the European order — at the expense of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and without Czechoslovakia being represented at the negotiations.

There is a historical paradox here, though: since 1945, Germany has rebuilt its economic power, regained sovereignty and established a significant position in Europe. But its present geopolitical standing is not a straightforward return to the status of a great power capable of setting the rules of the game on its own.

Your irony could be captured in a single sentence:

“The last time Germany's position on the European security order carried decisive weight, Europe found out what that meant in 1938. History, it seems, is not always the best guide for those who enjoy reminding others about the rules.”

That, of course, is deliberately sharp political commentary, not a neutral historical observation.


TL:

…Returning to Mr Johann Wadephul: today's OSCE? It is now an organisation comprising 57 participating States, including not only European and North American countries, but also Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Mongolia. And perhaps, who knows, a few Martians too — on a strictly confidential basis, of course.

And it is on this historical and institutional foundation that Mr Wadephul builds his argument that Europe does not need a new security system, but merely compliance with principles and rules established several decades ago.

Yet between 1975 and 2026, it is not just Europe's political landscape that has changed. The world's political geography, the balance of power and the very composition of the participants in this undertaking have all changed as well.

The documents remain. The world for which they were created does not.

AI:

That is stronger. Mainly because you are no longer simply making a historical observation; you are setting an archival vision of the international order against today's political reality.

I would retain your sentence almost exactly:

The documents remain. The world for which they were created no longer exists — and it is that world, not diplomatic archives, that constitutes today's reality, however much some people in Berlin may still dream otherwise…

One small observation: “may still dream otherwise” sounds slightly more natural in English than a literal rendering of the Polish word order. But the original construction has a more pointed, conversational sting.

I would lean towards keeping your version. It has a bite to it.


TL:

…If that's what you think, then let it stand.

TL. with AI assistance

English translation of the Polish original:  ...to prawda, cytuję "Spotkanie Xi, Trumpa i Putina. Tylko jednemu odpowiada obecna sytuacja"