An idea that may make more sense than European commentators would care to admit — and the political logic of reaching agreement across dividing lines.
My morning reading in The Wall Street Journal. The headline catches my eye: “Viktor Orbán, U.N. Secretary-General?” Beneath it is a report that officials in Donald Trump’s administration are considering the idea of a joint candidate backed by the United States, Russia and China for the post of UN secretary-general.
My first thought? Why not?
I am not arguing that Viktor Orbán must become UN secretary-general. Nor am I claiming that the idea described in the article has evolved into an agreed initiative by the three powers. What interests me is something else: the logic of the idea itself.
The United States, Russia and China. Three countries whose interests do not coincide, which compete with one another and sometimes find themselves on opposite sides of geopolitical conflicts. And yet that is precisely why any agreement between them on who should occupy the most important post at the United Nations would be worth examining.
Not because their differences would suddenly disappear. Quite the opposite. Because they might be able, on a particular issue, to set those differences aside and identify a common interest.
An organisation built by great powers, intended to serve the world
Let us not forget that the United Nations did not emerge from a political vacuum. Its foundations were laid after the Second World War, with the victorious powers playing a decisive role. The special status of the five permanent members of the Security Council, including their veto power, was built into the very structure of the organisation.
That is no incidental detail. It is the political architecture of a system designed to take the actual distribution of power into account, rather than rely solely on the declared equality of states.
The United States, Russia and China therefore have no need to recover formal powers they never lost. They still possess them. What they might seek to recover is something no article of the UN Charter can guarantee: the ability to act together and shape the political direction of an institution they helped create.
That is an important distinction.
The UN General Assembly has 193 member states. It appoints the secretary-general on the recommendation of the Security Council. But even broad support among the other member states cannot overcome a veto by any of the Council’s permanent members.
If Washington, Moscow and Beijing were genuinely to agree on a common candidate, that would not automatically guarantee the candidate’s appointment. It would, however, send a political signal: three great powers could reach agreement on who should occupy a post whose significance extends far beyond the day-to-day administration of the United Nations.
It would not amount to taking over the organisation. It would demonstrate their ability to act collectively within the existing system.
Why, then, does an agreement between the three powers make sense as a hypothesis?
Because it invites us to look at the United Nations not only as an institution pursuing the noble aims set out in its Charter, but also as an arena in which states of vastly unequal power pursue and compete over their interests.
If the three powers managed to agree on a common candidate, that would not mean the end of their rivalry. It could, however, demonstrate that they are capable of reaching agreements across their differences when particular interests converge.
And that, to my mind, is the most interesting aspect of the whole idea. Not Orbán’s name, not Trump’s personal sympathies, and not European outrage at the very possibility of such a deal.
The real question is whether the great powers can once again act like great powers: recognise their own interests, negotiate and reach agreements, rather than treat every disagreement as an insurmountable obstacle.
This would not restore formal powers, because those powers remain in place. It would be an attempt to restore political agency to the three powers by making joint use of mechanisms that have been integral to the UN’s structure from the outset.
Of course, a common candidate would not prove that a new world order was taking shape. For now, we are discussing a hypothesis about a possible evolution in the balance of power, not a confirmed plan.
But it raises a question that should not be dismissed with a shrug.
Will the future global order be shaped by ever more elaborate institutions and political declarations? Or will its direction continue to be determined above all by the ability of great powers to reach agreements, recognise shared interests and make decisions?
In conclusion
The United States alongside Russia and China.
This is neither a picture of an existing world government nor evidence that the three powers have agreed on a common strategy. It is a hypothesis that draws attention to the possibility of rival states reaching an understanding when they recognise that, on certain issues, acting together may serve their interests.
Perhaps, then, the most important question is not whether Viktor Orbán will become the next UN secretary-general.
It is this: are we entering a period in which the great powers will seek to agree among themselves on the most consequential institutional decisions, using the existing mechanisms of the United Nations to shape the global order collectively?
For now, let us leave the question open.
TL, with the assistance of AI
