Zelensky, Trump, and the Illusion of Control
Morning Reflections on Stephen Bryen’s Article in Asia Times
Over my morning cup of coffee, I read Stephen Bryen’s article in Asia Times, titled “Attacking Trump, Zelensky Showed Lack of Judgment.”
Bryen focuses on what he sees as Volodymyr Zelensky’s political miscalculation: the Ukrainian president has entered into open confrontation with Donald Trump despite Ukraine’s fundamental dependence on continued American support. In the background are Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, the dispute over the terms of a possible energy ceasefire, and tensions surrounding American technological and intelligence support.
It is an argument worth taking seriously. But does the problem really come down to Zelensky’s misjudgment?
I believe the stakes are considerably higher.
Washington Is Not Berlin
Zelensky seems not always to appreciate one fundamental distinction: whoever occupies the White House, the president of the United States is not a European leader who can be politically bound to the Ukrainian cause through moral appeals, calls for solidarity, or the political cost of withdrawing support.
Washington is under no obligation to subordinate its policy to Kyiv’s interests. It can make assistance conditional on its own strategic calculations, change its priorities, and expect Ukraine to take American preferences into account.
Yet there is a paradox here.
The ability to exert pressure is not the same as the ability to control another party’s decisions.
The United States may possess resources Ukraine desperately needs and still be unable to compel Kyiv to behave as Washington would like in every instance. Ukraine is fighting its own war, acting on its own assessment of the threat, and pursuing objectives it does not necessarily regard as subordinate to American priorities.
Zelensky’s public confrontation with Trump can therefore be seen not merely as a diplomatic mistake, but also as an illustration of the limits of American influence.
The Difference Between Leverage and Control
This is where the issue becomes considerably more interesting than a personal dispute between two presidents.
Washington can restrict arms supplies, access to intelligence, or technological support. That does not mean it can dictate the course of Ukrainian policy at will. Pressure may persuade Kyiv to make concessions, but it may also deepen the conflict between the interests of the two countries.
Moscow and Beijing do not need to conclude that American influence over Ukraine has disappeared altogether. It is enough for them to recognize the gap between the resources Washington commands and the results it can actually achieve through them.
For any great power, that distinction matters.
Ukraine, Europe, and Iran
Look beyond Ukraine to Europe and America’s war with Iran, and a broader question emerges: how useful is the very concept of American hegemony in describing the world as it exists today?
In Ukraine, American superiority does not translate into full control over Kyiv’s decisions.
In Europe, Washington’s influence over its allies does not mean their interests will always align with those of the United States. European governments may depend on the American security umbrella while pursuing their own political, economic, and electoral calculations.
In the case of Iran, military superiority is likewise no guarantee that Washington can achieve all its political objectives in a war. A country can command formidable armed forces and still encounter the limits of its ability to shape events.
Each case is different. Yet all three point to the same problem: possessing instruments of pressure does not guarantee the ability to impose a desired outcome.
What Moscow and Beijing Can Learn
From Moscow’s and Beijing’s perspective, the significance of these developments extends well beyond who wins the next confrontation with Trump.
They can observe how the United States deploys its power, how its allies and partners respond, and what costs arise when Washington tries to compel political concessions.
There is no need to assume that Moscow and Beijing draw identical conclusions. It is enough to recognize that the gap between American power and American control over events provides both countries with material for their own strategic calculations.
This does not automatically mean the end of American hegemony. It does mean that its actual limits can no longer be assessed adequately through military spending, technological superiority, or America's global presence alone.
A Power That Cannot Dictate the Outcome
Stephen Bryen is right to draw attention to the risks Zelensky is taking by openly confronting Trump. Ukraine could pay a heavy price for that confrontation.
But there is another side to the problem. If Washington increasingly has to demonstrate its capacity to apply pressure in order to secure the concessions it seeks, that does not necessarily indicate greater political control.
It may indicate precisely the opposite: the limits of that control.
I would not yet declare the end of American hegemony. But the concept becomes increasingly inadequate if it is taken to mean that American superiority automatically translates into the ability to dictate the behaviour of other states.
A great power can retain enormous material strength while discovering that it no longer controls the political consequences of its own decisions to the extent it once did.
That, to me, is the most important conclusion to draw from Bryen’s article and from this morning’s conversation.
The issue is not simply whether Zelensky has made yet another mistake by attacking Trump. It is that Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Kyiv are operating in a world where superiority no longer guarantees control, dependence does not mean obedience, and political outcomes do not always match the intentions of the strongest player.
Perhaps, then, talk of unchallenged American hegemony is increasingly becoming a matter of diplomatic courtesy towards an established image of the world — an image that is struggling to keep pace with reality.
T.L., in collaboration with ChatGPT AI
